Annex 3. Secrecy and Dependence: The UK Trident System in the 21st Century
Labour's second term in office will cover a critical period for the future of the international
regimes controlling nuclear weapons. The next nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review
conference will be held in 2005. The UK Government is strongly committed to the NPT, but if the
nuclear non-proliferation regime is to be made more robust, progress must be made over the next
four years to implement the commitments to move toward disarmament made at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. This report highlights some of the key nuclear policy questions that will need to be
addressed during Labour's second term. What is the likely impact of the Bush Administration's
nuclear policies on Britain's highly US-dependent nuclear forces? Should Trident be replaced in the
future or entered into multilateral disarmament negotiations? Should the service life of Trident be
extended, or could Trident submarines be converted to become conventionally armed submarines in the
future? Can nuclear weapons be used as a deterrent to proliferators? In light of recent challenges
in the courts, is British nuclear policy legal?
British Nuclear Policy under Labour (1997-2001)
Trident is now the UK's only nuclear weapon system and is expected to remain in service for
approximately 30 years. Following the 1997 election, the new Labour government conducted a
Strategic Defence Review (SDR), based on the premise that circumstances had changed dramatically
since Trident was ordered. However, changes to Britain's nuclear policy and posture since 1997 have
been fairly cautious: the number of Trident warheads deployed has been reduced from 60 to 48
warheads per submarine; and the number of Trident II missiles procured has been reduced from 65 to
58 missiles. The biggest change in Labour Party thinking on nuclear policy has been the abandonment
of a 'No-first-use' policy. This was discussed before Labour came into power, but was quietly
dropped after the 1997 election. Similarly, although committed to strengthening security assurances
to non-nuclear weapon states while in opposition, the Labour Government has signalled that the use
of nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological threats has not been ruled out, following the US
policy of 'deliberate ambiguity'. The so-called 'sub-strategic' role for Trident has been mainly
linked with deterrence of chemical and biological threats.
In addition, access to information and parliamentary scrutiny of nuclear policy is now more
difficult than it was under the Major and Thatcher governments. Abandoning the annual defence
estimates in 1997, the UK Government now publishes a limited range of less comprehensive and ad hoc
documents. With major changes now taking place in US nuclear policy, and significant developments
at Aldermaston concerning the future of the UK's nuclear force, it is imperative that regular and
detailed Government reporting to Parliament, together with effective parliamentary scrutiny, are
restored.
British Nuclear Policy: Secrecy and Dependence
British nuclear policy is closely intertwined with that of the United States on many levels. For
example, there is a high level of co-operation between the US nuclear weapons laboratories and
Britain's Atomic Weapons Establishment on stockpile stewardship and management of the Trident
warhead. This is seen as essential for maintaining the ability to replace Trident in the future.
Moreover, in recent years, contact between personnel working on the respective UK and US nuclear
weapons programmes appears to have increased dramatically. In addition, Britain's Trident
submarines use US Trident II D5 missiles produced and serviced in the United States, and held at
the Kings Bay Submarine Base in Georgia. The British Trident submarines also conduct missile test
firings at the US Eastern Test Range, off the coast of Florida. In operational terms, British
Trident submarine patrols are closely coordinated with US Trident patrols.
Courting Trouble
In July 1996, in a landmark ruling the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory
opinion on the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons" following a request
from the UN General Assembly. The Court was unanimous that "there exists an obligation to
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all
its aspects under strict and effective international control". The Court also ruled that any
use of nuclear weapons would "generally contravene" the principles and rules of
humanitarian law. Following the ICJ Ruling, the legality of British nuclear policy has been
challenged in the British courts and through non-violent actions against the Trident programme.
The Impact of Bush Administration Policies
The current Republican administration is planning to radically alter the size, composition and the
role of its nuclear arsenal, a shift that it likely to impact heavily on UK nuclear policy. Some of
these emerging strategies, including projected deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal, offer the UK
Government an opportunity to dramatically advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. Radical cuts in
the US arsenal announced by President George W. Bush in November 2001 are likely to place pressure
on the UK Government - which has long argued that it maintains the minimum nuclear arsenal
concurrent with its own defence needs - to re-evaluate its own force composition. It would also
present the UK Government with an ideal opportunity to broaden and institutionalise the process,
possibly endorsing five power nuclear disarmament talks suggested by Russia and supported by
France.
The Disintegration of Multilateral Arms Control
In the wake of Bush's presidential victory, a unilateralist, 'America First' ideology has taken
hold in the White House, which is shaped by two dominant themes: a strong opposition to
international treaties and a desire to maintain the US position as the dominant world superpower.
These two pressures are driving US arms control policy in a way that indicates a direct collision
course with UK priorities. The deep-seated opposition to international agreements, a hallmark of
Republican thinking in the past, has become even more entrenched in recent years. The Bush
administration has repeatedly either refused to join international agreements, or watered them down
to fit its own purpose.
These policies challenge the existing 'treaty-based' framework of international arms control and
conflict directly with the Labour Government's stated policy commitments. Ongoing speculation that
Washington may attempt to precipitate the collapse of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
along with a lack of movement in the commitments made at the 2000 NPT review conference, pose grave
threats to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. If Britain is to ensure the
survival of these hard won treaties and fulfil its own disarmament commitments, the UK Government
should exert its influence and urge the United States to adopt a more progressive line.
A More Aggressive US Nuclear Posture
The US nuclear posture includes both the option of nuclear first use and the targeting of
non-nuclear weapon states. A number of recent reports indicate that the United States is
considering options designed to expand the range of missions for its nuclear arsenal. In
particular, influential planners are advocating the use of nuclear warheads for tackling hardened,
deeply buried targets, and widely dispersed mobile missile launchers. A range of new, low-yield
'mini-nukes' are being discussed as the best means of fulfilling these roles, and their development
could involve a resumption of nuclear testing. In addition, the debate regarding the response to
the 11 September terrorist attacks has highlighted the question of whether the Pentagon would
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to threats or attacks from terrorists or
'rogue states' using chemical or biological weapons. Washington has long maintained a policy of
deliberate ambiguity over the targeting of non-nuclear weapons states. An open declaration that it
reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons in such circumstances would signify a
significant change in policy.
In the past, NATO and the United Kingdom have generally replicated changes in US posture in their
own nuclear policies. At a time when the legality of its nuclear deterrent is being increasingly
questioned, the Labour Government can ill-afford to be forced into signing up to a more aggressive
targeting posture.
The Future of Trident
The United States is currently engaged in a number of programmes designed to extend, improve or, in
some cases, radically alter the capabilities of its Trident fleet. These programmes include
enhancing the capabilities of the Trident missile, improving the effectiveness of the Trident
warhead, extending the lifespan of the system as a whole and beginning work on converting at least
two submarines to conventional use. Given the close cooperation between the US and UK Governments
on all aspects of the Trident programme, it is highly likely that the UK Government could also
choose to become involved in any, or all, of these programmes. The UK Government continues to
assert that its Trident programme is intended to have a service life of approximately 30 years.
However, if Aldermaston is already considering the future of the Trident warhead, any US initiated
programme to extend the service life of submarines would be of great interest, as would plans for
an eventual replacement. Initial British Government thinking on a replacement for Trident may
already be underway. Given the potential costs involved with life extension, refurbishment and
replacement programmes for nuclear weapons, and the UK Government's past record in concealing these
developments from democratic scrutiny, the Defence Select Committee's request for a restatement of
Government policy on nuclear weapons is extremely timely.
The History of British Nuclear Policy
Britain's nuclear weapons programme dates back to the Second World War, when the Churchill
Government established the MAUD Committee to guide British research on atomic energy and the
feasibility of developing a 'super-bomb'. The MAUD Committee's report in 1941 was instrumental in
driving forward the US Manhattan project to develop the atomic bomb, in which many British
scientists participated.
Although British collaboration with the United States on nuclear weapons was severely curtailed
after the war by the US Congress, Britain proceeded to test its first nuclear bomb in 1952 and to
manufacture nuclear weapons for deployment on its V bombers. Nuclear co-operation with the United
States was resumed in the late 1950s with the signing of the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, and in
1963 the Polaris Sales agreement was signed. The 1958 Agreement provides the basis for ongoing
co-operation between the UK's nuclear weapons establishment and the US nuclear weapons laboratories
to this day, while the current agreement for the United Kingdom to procure the US Trident missile
system is based on the Polaris Sales Agreement.
Most British nuclear disarmament initiatives have been unilateral and fairly limited in scope, for
example: the decision in 1993 to cancel the nuclear armed Tactical Air-Surface Missile (TASM)
before it could enter production; and the decision to withdraw the WE177 "free fall"
bombs (which had been deployed by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force) from service ahead of
schedule. Other withdrawals of nuclear forces have been imposed on the United Kingdom by the United
States, such as the removal of the nuclear Lance missile and the nuclear artillery role, which were
carried out using US nuclear weapons held under "dual-key" arrangements. These weapons
were withdrawn following the unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons announced by
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991.
Trident is now the UK's only nuclear weapon system. The 'system' consists of:
- four British-built Trident submarines - HMS Vanguard, HMS Victorious, HMS Vigilant, and HMS Vengeance (the first of which entered service in 1994, and the last in 1999);
- US Trident II D5 missiles (each submarine is capable of carrying up 16 of these missiles); and
- nuclear warheads, built and serviced by the UK's atomic weapons establishments, although the warhead design is believed to be closely based on the US Trident warhead, W76, with a yield of approximately 100 kilotons. The British nuclear arsenal is based on a stockpile of "less than 200 operationally available warheads".
The Trident system is expected to remain in service for approximately 30 years.
Following the 1997 election, the new UK Government conducted a Strategic Defence Review (SDR),
setting out its policy on the full spectrum of defence policy including nuclear weapons. Although
the SDR is based on the premise that there has been a "relaxation of tension and vast
improvement in current strategic conditions since the end of the Cold War", changes to
Britain's nuclear policy and posture since 1997 have been fairly cautious, and there have been few
changes since the review was published in 1998.
British nuclear-armed submarine deployment since the 1970s
|
| Force size |
1970s |
1980s-1990s |
1994-1997 |
1998 onwards |
| Polaris |
Polaris Chevaline |
Trident, Conservative Policy |
Trident, Labour Policy |
| Submarines |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
| Submarines on patrol |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Missiles per submarine |
16 |
16 |
12-16 |
12-16 |
| Warheads per submarine |
48 |
32 |
60 |
48 |
| Submarine targeting capability |
16 |
16 |
60 |
48 |
|
|
Source: Official Report, House of Commons, 16 July 1998, col. 237; 30 July 1998, col. 452 and The
Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, The Stationery Office, July 1998 p 5-2
|
The SDR also decided that the policy of continuous deterrent patrols, dating back to the
introduction of Polaris in 1968, should be continued: "one Trident submarine should be
maintained on deterrent patrol at any time". It rejected other proposals for de-alerting such
as removing warheads from missiles and storing them separately on shore. Instead, the Government
announced that Trident would "normally be at several days 'notice to fire'". Suggestions
that the fourth Trident submarine, HMS Vengeance, could be 'mothballed' were also ruled out as the
SDR argued that the fourth Trident submarine was needed to retain "an effective deterrent for
up to 30 years".
Trident is also significantly more advanced than Polaris. The D5 missile has a longer range,
greater speed and higher level of accuracy than the Polaris missile. In particular, Trident's
multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles allow warheads deployed on a single missile to
hit separate targets, thereby greatly increasing the number of targets that Trident can reach.
The Strategic Defence Review also announced a reduction in the number of Trident II missiles that
it planned to procure from 65 to 58. Not all of these missiles will be deployed: 14 are expected to
be test fired during the lifetime of the UK Trident force, while four will be held as a processing
margin (see table 2).
Although there was no mention of 'No-first-use' in the SDR, in response to parliamentary questions,
government defence spokesperson, Lord Hoyle revealed: "We considered No-first-use in the
Strategic Defence Review but saw no reason to change our and NATO's current nuclear policy".
Since the 1960s, NATO has refused to rule out the option of being the first to use a nuclear weapon
in a conflict situation. In the euphoria following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance's 1990
London Declaration announced that nuclear weapons were now weapons of "last resort", but
in NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991, the question of 'No-first-use' of nuclear weapons was not
mentioned. NATO's military commanders have always interpreted the absence of any political
statement ruling out first-use of nuclear weapons as meaning that the option of using nuclear
weapons first is not prohibited, and that therefore Alliance nuclear planning can include this
option.
US nuclear posture also includes the option of nuclear first use. In late 1997, during the same
period that the UK Government was conducting its SDR, President Clinton issued a new Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD 60), giving guidelines to the US military on targeting of nuclear weapons.
Far from ruling out 'first-use', PDD 60 reportedly extended the role of US nuclear weapons to
include deterring potential proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.
Against this background, and amidst rumours of pressure from the Pentagon to drop the issue, the
publication of the SDR, followed NATO's strategy to the letter by avoiding any mention of
'No-first-use'.
Immediately after the release of the SDR, in response to written questions in the House of Lords
concerning nuclear retaliation in the case of "aggressor states contemplating the use of
chemical and biological weapons", Lord Hoyle confirmed that:
The use of chemical or biological weapons by any state would be a grave breach of international
law. A state which chose to use chemical or biological weapons against the United Kingdom should
expect us to exercise our right of self defence and to make a proportionate response.
Phrases such as 'proportionate response' are deliberately ambiguous, intended to convey the message
that potential nuclear use has not been ruled out. For example, a UK Ministry of Defence report,
Defending Against the Risk: Chemical and Biological Weapons, concluded:
To date [1999] neither arms control nor export controls have been sufficient to prevent the
proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We must therefore also seek to deter the use of
biological and chemical weapons by assuring a potential aggressor of three related outcomes, namely
that: their use will not be allowed to secure political or military advantage; it will, on the
contrary, invite a proportionately serious response; and that those, at every level, responsible
for any breach of international law relating to the use of such weapons, will be held personally
accountable.
By using language usually associated with nuclear weapons such as the reference to deterring a
'potential aggressor' and using a 'proportionately serious response', the UK Government signalled
that the use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical or biological threats has not been ruled out.
Trident: a US Warhead Design
The United Kingdom cooperates extensively with the United States on warhead design, development and
ongoing stockpile stewardship for the Trident warhead. Cooperation takes place under the 1958
Agreement for Co-operation on the use of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes and a range of
related agreements, amendments and Memoranda of Understanding, many of which are still classified.
The 1958 agreement provides for the exchange of classified information concerning nuclear weapons
to improve "design, development and fabrication capability".
The UK Trident warhead is believed to be closely based on one of the US Trident warheads, W76,
which has a yield of approximately 100 kilotons. Although this has never been officially confirmed,
documents released under the US Freedom of Information Act indicate that in the early 1980s, when
the UK was designing its Trident warhead, the Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group established
communication channels to allow the US to pass to the UK "atomic information on the MK-4
Re-entry Body and W76 Warhead for the Trident Missile Systems". In addition, the British
Trident warhead was tested at the US Nevada Test Site.
|