SECTION 2. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DEFENSE POLICIES

1. Iran to Discuss Arms, Nuclear with Russia (United Press International, 1 October 2001)

    An Iranian delegation led by Tehran's defense minister was scheduled to arrive in Moscow Monday for a four-day visit to discuss arms and nuclear power sales between the two nations.

Iran's Defense Ministry spokesman Keivan Khosravi said talks between Iranian and Russian officials would focus on forging defensive, military and technical cooperation based on "each country's national laws as well as international conventions."

"The defense minister (Ali Shamkhani) is to hold talks with Russian officials on ways of expanding ties within the framework delineated by the presidents of the two countries," said Khosravi - a reference to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's March visit to Moscow. The trip was originally scheduled for early September, but was postponed because Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was in Moscow at the time.

Some analysts say the trip is part of an ongoing effort by Iran to bolster its ties with Russia in a bid to undermine the grip of U.S. sanctions on its economy. (http://www.ransac.org/)

2. Russia and Iran Sign Arms Deal; Nuclear Reactors on the Way (New York Times, 3 October 2001)

    Six years after it stopped major arms sales to Iran under pressure from the United States, Russia signed a new military accord with Iran today that the Kremlin said could lead to $300 million in annual sales of jets, missiles and other weapons.

The Iranian defense minister, Adm. Ali Shamkhani, and Russia's defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, discussed the two nations' roles in an antiterrorism campaign today, the second day of Mr. Shamkhani's five-day visit, but offered no details of their conversation.

Both Russia and Iran are enemies of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and of Osama bin Laden.

Mr. Ivanov said last week that the two countries could find common ground in battling international terrorism. The United States sees Russia, a supporter of Western military action against the Taliban, as a potentially valuable go-between in persuading Iran to support its military actions there, or at least to refrain from attacking them.

Mr. Shamkhani said this afternoon that Iran would support military strikes against Afghanistan, but only if they were authorized by the international community acting through the United Nations.

Terrorism, he said, could not be defeated in a society "under the influence of superpowers." (http://www.nytimes.com/)

3. U.S., Russia Recast Their Relationship Anti-Terror Agenda Appears To Be Framework for Future (Washington Post, 4 October 2001)

    In the most visible embodiment of that change yet, President Vladimir Putin paid the first visit by a Russian leader to NATO headquarters in Brussels yesterday and announced that Moscow could accept the further enlargement of the Western alliance, created and long maintained solely to confront the Red Army. But the announcement could also reshape the discussion of other divisive issues as well, including Russia's war against separatists in Chechnya, Russia's debt to the West, regional security in Asia and the Middle East, and the Bush administration's plans to proceed with a missile defense system by withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

"Twelve years after the wall came down, it's a reminder that we face common challenges and a potential for cooperation," said a senior U.S. official.

He asked the Russians to share their intelligence about bin Laden's al Qaeda network and their experiences in conducting military operations in Afghanistan, so painfully earned in the 1980s while battling U.S.-funded mujaheddin fighters. He asked about Russian support for the opposition Northern Alliance, which is battling the ruling Taliban movement in Afghanistan that protects bin Laden.

Most sensitively, he said the United States intended to dispatch its forces to the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which are strategically perched on Afghanistan's northern border. Many of Russia's top generals and security chiefs were loath to allow American troops in their traditional sphere of influence, but Armitage did not want the Kremlin to stand in the way.

Similar sentiments from other Russian generals and nationalist politicians were clouding the air when Armitage arrived in Moscow, fresh from winning Pakistan's help in hunting down bin Laden at a meeting in Washington with Pakistan's intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed.

Armitage knew Trubnikov, his Russian counterpart. They had met in May in the context of a U.S.-Russian working group on Afghanistan established during the final year of the Clinton administration. Now, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov instructed that the working group take up specific operational issues related to the U.S. response to the terrorist attacks.

During what may be the most fateful conversation of Bush's short tenure in office, Putin informed him of his decision about the Central Asian republics. He also assured Bush that Russia would share its intelligence and provide an air corridor for humanitarian missions to Afghanistan in connection with the U.S. campaign.

The Russians told the administration that Putin would be making a major policy statement on Chechnya. They made clear that they expected a positive, public response from the White House. Bush administration officials said they would listen closely to Putin's remarks and, if they were indeed forthcoming, the United States would respond favorably.

Putin took to the airwaves on Monday, Sept. 24. In a brief speech, he told his countrymen that Russia would support the U.S.-led campaign against bin Laden's al Qaeda network by sharing intelligence, providing airspace for humanitarian flights and participating in search-and-rescue missions. He said Russia would supply arms to the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban movement. And he said Russia had "coordinated this position with our allies among the Central Asian states. They share this position and do not rule out providing use of their airfields."

Putin then raised the Chechnya conflict. Moscow's brutal crackdown on separatists in the southern Russian republic has long been a sore point in U.S.-Russian relations, with the United States regularly condemning Russia for human rights abuses there.

Putin repeated the long-standing Russian line that international terrorism played a role in the Chechen uprising. But he added this time that it also had its "own history," recognizing that local factors contributed to Chechen grievances. And he reversed his earlier resistance to a political settlement, giving Chechen leaders 72 hours to start negotiations with Moscow.

The next day, Sept. 26, the break came. The NSC's viewpoint prevailed. White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, who had never mentioned Chechnya in his daily briefings, made a statement to reporters. Senior officials had labored over the wording. Much of it was identical to what Boucher said a day earlier.

But Fleischer added a few crucial lines. He recognized Putin's televised address as "a very important speech," saying that Bush appreciated the Russian offer of cooperation in fighting terrorism. And Fleischer added, "The president also wants to note particularly President Putin's remarks about the situation in Chechnya."

For the first time, the Bush White House said it shared Putin's concerns about the role of "international terrorists" in Chechnya and called on the Chechen leadership unconditionally to dissociate itself from groups like al Qaeda. While urging both Russians and Chechens to refrain from human rights violations, Fleischer said Bush welcomed the "sincere steps" Putin took to open a political dialogue with the rebels. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/)

4. Despite Warming, U.S.-Russia Relations Face Hurdles (Reuters, 4 October 2001)

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has offered the United States broad anti-terrorism support, including opening the country's air space to relief missions, taking part in search-and-rescue operations and arming forces opposed to the Taliban, which control most of Afghanistan and are believed to be sheltering bin Laden.

Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice , hailed Russia's close cooperation, singling out Putin's phone call to Bush shortly after the attacks as a "crystallizing moment for the end of the Cold War."

The U.S.-Russian engagement until Sept. 11 was focused largely on Bush's proposal for a missile defense plan that Putin has never embraced.

"The United States and Russia may be well on their way to a fundamentally different relationship," Rice said. "That fundamentally different relationship, as it becomes based more and more on common values, will serve not only Russia and the United States well, but the entire world."

Specifically, Rice said the White House would continue to pressure Moscow to curb the proliferation of weapons, particularly to Iran. According to administration officials, Russian companies were helping Iran develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

"It's our view that this is not good for Russia, and not good for the United States and not good for the region," Rice said. (http://www.reuters.com/)

5. The Challenges of Alliance With Russia (New York Times, 5 October 2001)

    Throughout the 1990's, any use of force by the United States sent President Boris Yeltsin of Russia into a red-faced fury. No matter the target, he would fulminate about Washington's arrogance, invoke Russia's nuclear might, even warn of World War III. Mr. Eltsin's outbursts were brief but ferocious, and they reflected a widespread conviction among Russians that deep down, America's interests were different from theirs.

Now comes Vladimir Putin - by instinct and training a less likely friend of the United States than was Mr. Yeltsin - to offer support in our struggle against terrorism. His presence on President Bush's bandwagon is more than just a reversal of Russian policy on America's use of force. Mr. Putin, unlike his predecessor, seems to believe that there is a domestic consensus, or that he can create one, in favor of a broad rapprochement between Russia and the West.

This offers huge potential payoffs for American policy, and both sides should work hard to make it a reality. Mr. Putin showed his readiness to do so this week, in a statement that seemed to relax Russia's opposition to the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Bush administration is reciprocating with talk of speeding up Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization.

The most obvious problem is Moscow's appallingly brutal war in Chechnya. The administration has sought to narrow its differences with Russia on this issue, commending Mr. Putin's proposal for a political dialogue with the Chechen rebels and echoing his demand that they expel foreign "terrorists." (No one denies such fighters are there).

Russia's war in Chechnya has been a magnet and a motivator for the very terrorists who threaten Americans worldwide. It has given them new battlefield experience, extra fund-raising appeal, fresh recruits and greater fervor - the same fervor they deploy against us.

If the first threat to Russian-American cooperation is Moscow's effort to cast the Chechens in the role of Osama bin Laden, the second is the attempt to cast neighboring Georgia in the role of the Taliban - that is, as the protector of terrorists. We have had many differences with the Russians over Georgia. Mr. Putin seems particularly to enjoy shocking American visitors with his open hatred of the Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze. But Moscow's attitude has rarely been more ominous than it is now.

Russia's charge that Georgia is a Taliban-style haven for terrorists is preposterous. The danger it creates, however, cannot be ignored. When President Bush meets Mr. Shevardnadze today in Washington, he should leave no doubt about America's support for Georgia.

A third obstacle to lasting cooperation is the one on which many wartime alliances founder: postwar arrangements. When Mr. Putin chose not to try to keep his Central Asian neighbors from cooperating with the United States, he removed a major obstacle to a successful war effort. Yet in doing so, he is likely to have tried to assure skeptical advisers that his choice would not lead to a long-term American military presence in Central Asia.

They will want a shield: maybe thin, or even invisible, but real. And they will not want to rely exclusively on the two countries - Russia and China - that may be quickest to offer their services. One Uzbek official said just this week, "We want a guarantee that America will not begin a conflict and then just leave us to deal with the consequences."

It is no longer honest to disclaim, or prudent to forswear, the possibility of some kind of American military presence in Central Asia lasting well beyond a round or two of antiterrorist operations. Remembering the damage done by our indifference to Afghanistan once it had driven out the Soviet army, the United States cannot easily walk away from this war when it is over. Russia, having thought of the region as its natural sphere of influence for 150 years, will not easily accept our staying. Moscow and Washington may not be able to come to grips with this issue yet, but when and how they take it up will say a great deal about the depth and durability of their rapprochement. (http://www.nytimes.com/)