Annex 1. Some Major Challenges: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Terrorism

    Today I would like to share with you a few thoughts on some of the challenges the international community and the IAEA face in the fields of non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism.

Ensuring an Effective, Universal and Adequately Financed System for the Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Let me start by referring to a major challenge that is the focus of this symposium, namely to ensure that the IAEA safeguards system - the system that verifies States' non-proliferation commitments - is effective, universally adhered to and adequately financed.

Effectiveness of the System

    As you are aware, the Agency safeguards system verifies the non-proliferation commitment made under the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter. As such the Agency plays a key role - as an objective and technically credible body - in building mutual confidence among parties to the NPT by providing assurance of their compliance.

Currently, the Agency's priorities are two-fold: the implementation of the additional protocol measures in States that are party to the protocol, and the meshing of existing and new safeguards measures with a view to have an integrated safeguards system that is both effective and efficient. "Integrated safeguards" promises to usher in a smart, information driven, non-discriminatory system that is designed to draw comprehensive conclusions regarding compliance by a State with its non-proliferation obligations. It adopts new approaches, including a focus on the State as a whole, and increased interaction between the Agency and the State's System of Accounting and Control. The overriding objective continues to be a safeguards system that is effective in providing the required assurance. The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is nearing completion, and shortly the Agency will be ready to apply the full framework to those States which qualify for its application, namely States that have a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, and for which the Agency has completed the necessary evaluation and has drawn the required conclusions.

What is the proper balance between direct inspection and remote monitoring and why, in the year 2001, does the development of an effective camera system remain apparently so difficult, and when can we expect the current problems to be resolved?

How credible is wide-area environmental monitoring, and when will it become feasible to make use of it?

To what extent can the safeguards system make further use of satellite imagery?

Answers to these and other technical and policy questions will be especially helpful to the Secretariat as we move forward.

Participation in the System

    In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. Moreover, for seven States the Agency's evaluation was able to provide broader assurance: not only that there had been no diversion of declared nuclear material, but also that there was no indication of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. In the process of reaching these conclusions, the Agency was able to achieve more of its inspection goals than ever before, while still adhering to the "cost neutrality" objective - despite continuous increases in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities under safeguards.

Financing of the System

    Effective implementation of safeguards is also dependent on the availability of the necessary financial resources. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. And while our verification responsibilities have continued to grow, our safeguards budget, like the rest of the Agency budget, has been one of "zero real growth." This has forced us to rely on unpredictable "voluntary" funding for almost one-fifth of our safeguards activities, and has left us increasingly short of essential human resources, and technology needs. It is clear that if we are to continue to provide credible verification assurances, the complexity of our verification mission must be matched by the required resources.

Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control

    In my view, progress towards nuclear arms control is not only overdue but is essential to the sustainability of the non-proliferation regime in the long run. The "unequivocal commitment" by the nuclear weapon States during the 2000 NPT Review Conference to "accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons" is certainly a positive sign, but will have to be translated soon into concrete steps to gain credibility. Examples of those steps would include, inter alia, ratification of the START II treaty and the conclusion of START III, universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the commencement of the long anticipated negotiation towards a treaty that would prohibit the further production of fissile material for weapons purposes (the so-called "cut-off" treaty).

With regard to the three States - India, Pakistan and Israel - that have decided, for their own perceived security reasons, to retain the nuclear weapons option, I believe it is essential to actively engage them in the efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime and move towards nuclear disarmament. As we have been made amply aware by recent events, security is a global concern that requires global solutions and global participation.

Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism

    I turn now to a third major and recent challenge, that is protection against nuclear terrorism. The Agency has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to us all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested that I initiate a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism.

We are currently reviewing in depth each of these programmes to identify additional measures that need to be taken. Specifically, we are considering expanding the scope and reach of many of our services with a view, in particular, to upgrade physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources, to enhance accident prevention and mitigation in nuclear facilities, and to reinforce the emergency response mechanisms. Equally, we will review existing conventions and guidelines - including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material - to ensure that they are comprehensive and effective, and we will make every effort to promote their universal application. To enable the Agency to enhance its services in all these areas, and with a view to assist States that lack the resources to upgrade the security of their nuclear facilities and material, we are exploring the feasibility of establishing a Fund for Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. A preliminary paper that outlines our proposed response to the threat of nuclear terrorism will be submitted to our Board of Governors next month.

IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Statement to the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security (excerpted). October 29, 2001

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